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Abstract: 
In 2002 a US Predator drone operating above Afghanistan’s Paktia province spotted three men 
in Zhawar Kili, a complex slightly north of the infamous Tora Bora cave system, an area used by 
al-Qaeda leadership to train and regroup. One of the men was tall; supposedly the others were 
acting reverently towards him. Convinced the tall man was Osama bin Laden a Hellfire missile 
was fired from the Predator, killing all three men instantly. The tall man was not bin Laden. None 
of the men were even affiliated with al-Qaeda or the Taliban; they were simply civilians in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. This strike and many others that are all too similar raise a 
multitude of questions, both legal and moral, regarding the US lethal drone strike programme. 
This article attempts to examine the legal implications of US drone strikes; not only in 
Afghanistan, but further afield from the more traditional and accepted battlefields in Pakistan, 
Yemen and Somalia. 
 
Keywords: drone, UAV, armed conflict, jus in bello, jus ad bellum, international human rights 
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Introduction2 
‘Autonomy is the Future’3 
Some say the world changed forever after 9/11; certainly warfare did. The US began to arm 
their drone fleet; ‘the gloves were taken off’4 and their lethal drone programme began in earnest. 
                                                          
1
 James worked with the Royal National Lifeboat Institution in a seasonal role until November 2014. He is 
currently applying for postgraduate study beginning in September 2015 and looking to attain relevant 
work experience in the interim. He can be contacted at james.kirton@hotmail.com 
2
 This dissertation was concluded in April 2014 and as such does not consider drone strikes against ISIL 
(The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Islamic State) targets in 
Iraq and Syria, which began around June 2014. However, much of the discussion is still relevant to this 
emerging ‘conflict’ and the principles deliberated can easily be applied to this insurgency.  
3
 Singer, P., in Knoops, G-J, ‘Legal, Political and Ethical Dimensions of Drone Warfare under International 
Law: A Preliminary Survey’, (2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review, p.697. 
4
 Singer, P, ‘Military Robots and the Laws of War’, (2009) 23 The New Atlantis, p.37. 
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The continued appearance and use of new and progressive technology in the history of armed 
conflict is certainly nothing new, warfare and technology have always had an intimate 
relationship, but such advancement has often come at a pace which the law has struggled to 
match.5 It is against this backdrop that increasing pressure has been exerted on the United 
States over its controversial lethal drone strike programme.6 
 
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones)7 have become the weapon of choice in the United 
States’ fight against terrorism.8 They are deployed not only for intelligence and surveillance 
gathering purposes,9 but also to conduct the targeted killings of suspected terrorists in remote 
and dangerous regions of the world. 10  Whilst their development and historical origins are 
sporadic and protracted,11 their military utility is clear and since the first Gulf War there has not 
been a single conflict in which UAVs have not been deployed.12 With the end of the Cold War 
militaries began to shrink, public tolerance for military risk drastically declined, prominently 
evidenced by the abrupt withdrawal of American troops from Somalia after the Black Hawk 
Down disaster,13 and in the unwillingness to send in ground troops during genocides in Rwanda 
and the Balkans.14 Additionally, UAVs began to receive ringing endorsements from American 
Officials. The then Director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, famously referred to the technology as ‘the 
                                                          
5
 Vogel, R, ‘Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict’, (2010) 39(1) Denver Journal of International 
Law and Policy, p.103; Roland, A, ‘War and Technology’, (2009) 14(2) Foreign Policy Research Institute, 
para.23. 
6
 Bowcott, O, ‘Drone strikes by US may violate international law, says UN’, The Guardian, 18 October 
2013; ‘UN rapporteur Christof Heyns condemns use of drone strikes’, The Guardian, 17 October 2013. 
7
 The US Department of Defense defines drones as: ‘powered aerial vehicles sustained in flight by 
aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and guided without an onboard crew. They may be 
expendable or recoverable and can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely’ see Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles, (2003), para.1, http://www.defense.gov/specials/uav2002/ 2 October 2014. 
8
 Orr, A, ‘Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved: The Status of American Drone Strikes in Pakistan 
Under International Law’, (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal, p.730. 
9
 O’Connell, M, The American Society of International Law, The International Law of Drones, (2010), 
para.2, http://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/insights_101112.pdf0_.pdf 2 October 2014. 
10
 Breau, S, Drone Attacks, International Law, and the Recording of Civilian Casualties of armed conflict, 
(2011), p.1, http://works.bepress.com/susan_breau/1/ 2 October 2014. 
11
 For example: Singer, P, Wired for War, (2010), pp.46-60. 
12
 Armytechnology.com, UAV evolution – how natural selection directed the drone revolution, (2012), 
para.9, http://www.army-technology.com/features/featureuav-evolution-natural-selection-drone-revolution/ 
2 October 2014. 
13
 After a successful UN sanctioned operation to provide humanitarian aid to a starving population, the US 
turned its attention toward nation building. On 3 October 1993, US Special Forces were tasked to capture 
two associates of notorious warlord, Mohamed Farrah Aidid. They got their men, but as the force 
withdrew, two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down. The ensuing battle to recover the downed 
personnel resulted in the deaths of 18 US servicemen. Shocking footage was beamed around the world 
of Aidid’s men dragging three of the bodies through the streets of Mogadishu. Shortly afterward President 
Clinton ordered the entire US contingent to withdraw from Somali. 
14
 Singer, Wired for War, p.59. 
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only game in town’,15 and the Pentagon seemingly agrees. The Department of Defense has 
made producing and evolving all aspects of its drone fleet a strategic and budgetary priority for 
the future.16 ‘Technological developments began to coincide with changing political winds’;17 the 
stage was now set for the age of the drone. 
 
1    The Legal Position of the United States Government 
‘…the United States must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war’18 
The United States clearly intends to expand and advance its UAV programme, especially with 
regard to lethal strike operations.19 In fact, more strikes were reported to have been conducted 
during President Obama’s first year in office than in the previous eight years under George W 
Bush, and 2010 all but doubled that pace. 20  This expeditious increase has led to several 
government releases which aim to present the American legal justification for its use of force 
against al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces in the various territories they manifest 
themselves. It is important to note at the outset that all strikes are based on the 2001 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF).21 The joint resolution was passed in the 
wake of 9/11 at the behest of President Bush. Congress gave the President authorization to go 
to war with the architects of the attacks, namely members of al-Qaeda.22 The AUMF gave the 
President authorization to use all military force against those: 
 nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or 
 aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harboured such 
 organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
 against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.23 
 
                                                          
15
 ‘U.S airstrikes in Pakistan called ‘very effective’’, CNNPolitics.com, 18 May 2009. 
16
 Vogel, ‘Drone Warfare’, pp.104-105; US Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated 
Roadmap FY2011-2036, (2011),  
http://www.acq.osd.mil/sts/docs/Unmanned%20Systems%20Integrated%20Roadmap%20FY2011-
2036.pdf 2 October 2014. 
17
 Singer, Wired for War, p.59. 
18
 Koh, H, US Department of State, The Obama Administration and International Law, (March 25, 2010), 
para.52, http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm 2 October 2014. 
19
 Weinberger, S, ‘The ultra-lethal drones of the future’, New York Post, 17 May 2014; Horgan, J, ‘The 
Drones Come Home’, National Geographic, July 2010, paras.17-21. 
20
 ‘Pakistan denies U.S. request to expand drone access, officials say’, CNN, 22 November 2010, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/22/pakistan.us.drones/ 2 October 2014. 
21
 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub.L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); Zenko, M, ‘An 
Inconvenient Truth’, Foreign Policy, 11 April 2013, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/10/an_inconvenient_truth_drones#sthash.IN1vldy6.s8EG0q
yn.dpbs 2 October 2014. 
22
 Maxwell, M, ‘Rebutting the Civilian Presumption: Playing Whack-a-Mole Without a Mallet?’ in 
Finkelstein, C et al, (eds), Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World, (2012), pp.37-38. 
23
 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (2001) s.2(a). 
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The resolution mirrored the speech given by Bush shortly after 9/11 where he declared: ‘we will 
make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor 
them.’24 More recently, after promptings by the UN and other organisations, the then US State 
Department Legal Advisor, Harold Hongju Koh, presented the ‘considered view’25 of the Obama 
Administration with regard to lethal targeting operations, including those using drones, asserting: 
 as a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, 
 as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, 
 and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international 
 law.26 
 
This is an important and illuminating statement as to how the US views its use of force against 
those ‘responsible’ for the 9/11 attacks. Firstly, the characterisation of the struggle between the 
US and al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, as an armed conflict means any lethal 
strike operations are viewed under international humanitarian law (IHL),27 rather than under a 
law enforcement model where international human rights law (IHRL) would apply.28 This is 
pivotal and a controversial point; it is potentially decisive in the determination of the legality of a 
strike owing to several distinct differences between each legal framework. Under IHL a lower 
standard of necessity is required compared to that of IHRL.29 Necessity requires no more force 
or greater violence to be used to carry out an operation than is necessary in the 
circumstances.30 IHL then, allows for a greater amount of force to be employed to achieve that 
end. Specifically: ‘military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply 
any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least 
possible expenditure of time, life, and money.’31 IHRL does not allow for ‘any amount or kind’ of 
force and a killing is only permissible if it is required to halt an imminent threat to life,32 and there 
                                                          
24
 US Department of Defense, Bush: No Distinction Between Attackers and Those Who Harbor Them, 
(2001), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=44910 2 October 2014. 
25
 Koh, The Obama Administration, para.64. 
26
 Ibid, para.65. 
27
 Orr, ‘Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved’, p.742; international humanitarian law, the laws of 
war, jus in bello, and the law of armed conflict are used interchangeably. 
28
 Heller, K, ‘One Hell of a Killing Machine’, (2013) 11(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice, p.91. 
29
 Knoops, ‘Legal, Political and Ethical Dimensions of Drone Warfare’, p.713. 
30
 Solis, G, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War, (2010), pp.258-259. 
31
 United States v. Wilhelm List, et al. (“The Hostage Case”) (1948) XI Trials of War Criminals Before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals at 1253. 
32
 Heyns, C, United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, (2013, A/68/382), para.32, http://justsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/UN-Special-Rapporteur-Extrajudicial-Christof-Heyns-Report-Drones.pdf 3 
October 2014. 
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are no other available means, such as capture, to prevent that threat.33 Necessity in IHRL 
imposes an obligation to minimise the level of force, regardless of what is proportionate, unlike 
the same requirement under IHL.34 Secondly, the IHL principle of proportionality permits a more 
flexible approach to collateral damage caused during the course of an operation. Art.57.2(b) 
Additional Protocol I prescribes:35 
 an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the object is not a 
 military one or....that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of human life, 
 injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which may be 
 excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
 
The provision allows for some leeway between the expected military advantage and any 
collateral damage caused. In sharp contrast collateral damage can never be justified under 
IHRL.36 Clearly, the US governs its use of force in this sense by recourse to IHL; essentially 
lowering the threshold for when lethal force may be employed, making justification of targeted 
killings that much easier. Whether it is appropriate, or indeed possible, to apply IHL to all US 
drone strikes will be considered shortly, the application hinges on the existence of an armed 
conflict.37 
 
What is clear from various speeches and official sources is the American government exudes a 
united front. The struggle with al-Qaeda and its associated forces is classified as an armed 
conflict, specifically non-international in nature, meaning killings are to be viewed under IHL.38 
The US even argued that Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri’s 2000 attack on the USS Cole was governed 
                                                          
33
 Alston, P, United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, (2010, A/HRC/14/24/Add.6), para.32, 
http://unispal.un.org/pdfs/AHRC1424Add6.pdf 3 October 2014. 
34
 Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict, pp.258-259. 
35
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 [Additional Protocol I], entered into 
force 7 December 1978. All Articles cited in this discussion refer to Protocol I unless otherwise stated.  
36
 Knoops, ‘Legal, Political and Ethical Dimensions of Drone Warfare’, p.713; Breau, Drone attacks, p.13; 
Heller, ‘One Hell of a Killing Machine’, p.114. 
37
 Lubell, N, and Derejko, N, ‘A Global Battlefield?’, (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
p.87; Breau, Drone attacks, p.12. 
38
 Koh, The Obama Administration, para.52; The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks of 
John O. Brennan, “Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws”, (2011), para.19, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-
security-adhering-our-values-an 3 October 2014; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 548 U.S. 557 at 628-631; The 
United States Department of Justice White Paper, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a 
U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force, (2013), pp.1-2, 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf 3 October 2014; The 
United States Department of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University 
School of Law, (2012), para.36, http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-
1203051.html 3 October 2014. 
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by IHL, despite taking place before 9/11 and long before hostilities between the US and al-
Qaeda reached any level of significance.39 Koh also addresses when the US may resort to such 
a use of force. Domestic authorization is derived from the AUMF, however under international 
law the US relies on ‘its inherent right to self-defense’.40 The right to national self-defence is 
enshrined in Art.51 UN Charter41 which allows states to exercise self-defence in response to an 
armed attack. This again is important as the use of force within another state is generally 
considered unlawful but for self-defence, an authorization from the UN Security Council or host 
state consent.42 In the absence of host state consent, (consent from the state where the strike 
occurs), if the US is incorrectly relying on Art.51 it is clearly breaching international law. 
 
Lastly, it is worth outlining three conditions listed in a leaked Department of Justice White Paper. 
These set out the criteria which must be fulfilled before the US may proceed with an ‘operation 
using lethal force in a foreign country against a US citizen who is a senior operational leader of 
al-Qa’ida [sic] or an associated force.’43 
 1 An informed, high level official of the US government determines the targeted  
  individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the US. 
 2 Capture is infeasible and the US continues to monitor whether capture may  
  become feasible. 
 3 The operation would be conducted consistent with the applicable law of war  
  principles. 
Whilst the White Paper is specific to the targeted killing of US citizens, it is probable the process 
would be analogous to that of any targeted killing, notwithstanding the nationality of the target, 
and with nothing more publicly released about who may be targeted and when, this is really the 
only assumption one can make.44 
 
2    The Jus ad Bellum and Self-Defence 
‘There is little consensus...on when international law will permit unmanned aerial vehicles to 
target individuals’45 
                                                          
39
 Heller, ‘One Hell of a Killing Machine’, p.109; hostilities between the US and al-Qaeda are widely 
asserted to have intensified shortly after 9/11 and the passing of the AUMF. 
40
 US Department of Justice, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation, p.1. 
41
 United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, entered into force 24 October 1945. 
42
 Casey-Maslen, S, ‘Pandora’s box? Drone strikes under jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and international 
human rights law’, (2012) 94(886) International Review of the Red Cross, p.601. 
43
 US Department of Justice, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation, p.1. 
44
 The White Paper was probably written around the time American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki was killed, in 
September 2011, by a drone in Yemen. Although it is devoid of a date due to the fact it was not 
intentionally made publicly available. 
45
 Rozenberg, J, ‘Drone Dialogue’, (2013) The Law Society Gazette, para.1. 
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The jus ad bellum governs the resort to force between states, of which self-defence is a central 
concept. The US clearly relies upon ‘its inherent right to self-defense’ under Art.51 when 
conducting lethal drone strikes. Initially however, it should be recognised there is general 
prohibition on the use of force between states.46 Art.2(4) UN Charter prescribes: 
 All Members [of the United Nations] shall refrain in their international relations from the 
 threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,    
 or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
 
The provision was drafted after two world wars and primarily aimed to prevent further conflict. It 
is reflective of customary international law and is of a jus cogens47 nature, meaning it is a 
fundamental principle of modern day international order. It is not an absolute restriction though; 
this was recognised during the drafting of the Charter as wholly unrealistic.48 Consequently 
Art.51 allows for a specific derogation; permitting a state to employ self-defensive measures in 
response to an armed attack: 
 Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
 self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
 Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
 security. 
 
Therefore any use of force against another state, whilst being a prima facie breach of Art.2(4), 
may be justified by recourse to Art.51. In the absence of host state consent49 or UN Security 
Council authorization,50 any resort to force against another state, or on another state’s territory, 
is unquestionably a breach of international law unless it can be justified as a self-defensive 
action.51 Accordingly, a legal dilemma only arises where the host state does not consent to force 
occurring within its borders; self-defence merely precludes the wrongfulness of what would 
otherwise be an infringement of the host state’s sovereignty.52 This is hardly controversial53 as 
former Special Rapporteur Professor Alston affirms: 
                                                          
46
 Milanovic, M, ‘More on Drones, Self-Defense, and the Alston Report on Targeted Killings’, (2010) 
European Journal of International Law: Talk!, para.20. 
47
 Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (ICJ, Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 1986 (Merits), Separate Opinion of Judge Nagendra 
Singh, President. 
48
 Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors, p.26. 
49
 Schmitt, M, ‘Drone Attacks under the Jus ad Bellum And Jus in Bello: Clearing the ‘Fog of Law’’’, (2010) 
13 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, p.315; for example: NATO’s presence in Afghanistan is 
an example of host state consent to force occurring within a state’s own borders. 
50
 Lubell and Derejko, ‘A Global Battlefield?’, p.79; for example: UN Security Council Resolution 1973 
authorized a no-fly zone and the use of force to protect civilians and civilian areas targeted by Colonel 
Muammar Al-Qadhafi and his allied forces in Libya. 
51
 Casey-Maslen, ‘Pandora’s box?’, p.601; Lubell and Derejko, ‘A Global Battlefield?’, p.87. 
52
 Heller, ‘One Hell of a Killing Machine’, p.91; Milanovic, ‘More on Drones’, para.27. 
53
 Cassese, A, International Law, (2001), p.305. 
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 A targeted killing conducted by one State in the territory of a second State does not 
 violate the second State’s sovereignty if either the second State consents, or the first, 
 targeting State, has a right under international law to use force in self-defence under 
 Article 51 of the UN Charter, because the second State is responsible for an armed 
 attack against the first State, or the second State is unwilling or unable to stop armed 
 attacks against the first State launched from its territory.54 
 
It would seem the US may employ self-defensive force within the borders of another state 
provided that state has consented, the UN Security Council has authorized as such, or in the 
absence of consent, where that second state is responsible for an armed attack, or is unwilling 
or unable to prevent an armed attack being launched from within its territory against the US. 
However, much uncertainty has arisen regarding such justification with several matters 
complicating the position. 
 
Identity of the Attacker 
Despite there being no express mention of state involvement in Art.51, it has been suggested 
that self-defence can only be initiated in response to an armed attack by, or on behalf of, a 
state.55 This position was adopted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Construction 
of a Wall, additionally, before 11 September 2001 the idea of initiating self-defence in response 
to an attack by a non-state actor had not seriously been entertained.56 Based on the Court’s 
position it would seem the US would be unable to rely on Art.51 to justify its resort to force 
against those responsible for 9/11 (al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces) who cannot be 
attributed to a state nor do they conduct violence on behalf of any state; they are a non-state 
actor.57 However, there is increasing evidence which supports the view that non-state actors 
can be responsible for armed attacks for the purposes of Art.51. 
 
First, Art.51 makes no explicit acknowledgement of the identity of the attacker, unlike the 2004 
ICJ Advisory Opinion in the Construction of a Wall which concluded an armed attack must be 
‘by one State against another State’.58 Notwithstanding this reasoning several judges expressed 
                                                          
54
 Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur, (2010), para.35. 
55
 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (ICJ, The Wall 
Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 at para.139; after two world wars, the drafters were 
very much concerned with the behaviour of states, reflected in the Preamble of the Charter.  
56
 Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur, para.88. 
57
 Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force, pp.14-15; it is recognised here that actions of the Taliban may 
have been attributable to Afghanistan before they were deposed from ‘government’ by the joint US and 
UK invasion of 2001, although even then they were not recognised as a legitimate government of the 
Nation by many. 
58
 ICJ, The Wall Advisory Opinion at para.139. 
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dissatisfaction with the Court’s conclusion,59 a view propounded by commentators.60 The Court 
subsequently had a chance to re-visit the issue in Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda 
but largely avoided the question.61 Lubell notes if the Court considered the issue had been 
correctly posited in the Construction of a Wall then they would simply have reaffirmed this 
position: the fact the Court declined to answer the question indicates it is very much open for 
debate.62 Furthermore Judge Kooijmans, in his Separate Opinion in Congo v. Uganda, again 
declared non-state actors could be responsible for armed attacks: 
 If armed attacks are carried out by irregular bands from such territory against a 
 neighbouring State, they are still armed attacks even if they cannot be attributed to the 
 territorial State. It would be unreasonable to deny the attacked State the right to self-
 defence merely because there is no attacker State.63 
 
This appears rational; to deny the attacked state the possibility of self-defence simply because 
the attacker cannot be attributed to a state would seem wholly unreasonable. In fact, recent 
state practice appears to endorse this theory. Responding to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which 
cannot be attributed to a state,64 the UN Security Council issued Resolutions 1368 and 1373. 
Both Resolutions referred to the right to self-defence against those responsible,65 furthermore a 
NATO press release referred to 9/11 as an armed attack.66 Moreover, the Caroline Case widely 
considered as formative in the development of the rules of self-defence, involved Britain taking 
extraterritorial forcible measures against a non-state actor. 67  Clearly then the right to self-
defence was recognised in response to attacks by non-state actors: ‘the famous Caroline 
                                                          
59
 Ibid, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans at para.35; Declaration of Judge Buergenthal at para.6. 
60
 Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force, p.32; Paust, J, ‘Use of Armed Force against Terrorists in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond’, (2002) 35 Cornell International Law Journal, pp.533-534; Greenwood, C, 
‘International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq’, (2003) 4(7) San 
Diego International Law Journal, p.17. 
61
 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (ICJ, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment 19 December 2005 at paras.146-147. 
62
 Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force, p.33. 
63
 ICJ, Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans at para.30. 
64
 Paust, ‘Use of Armed Force against Terrorists’, pp.542-543; it is acknowledged that certain ties existed 
between al-Qaeda and the Taliban, who at the time of 9/11 exercised loose control over much of 
Afghanistan. 
65
 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1368 (2001) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4370
th
 
meeting, on 12 September 2001, (2001, S/RES/1368), para.4; United Nations Security Council, 
Resolution 1373 (2001) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385
th
 meeting, on 28 September 2001, 
(2001, S/RES/1373), para.5. 
66
 NATO, Press Release (2001) 124: Statement by the North Atlantic Council, (2001), para.2. 
67
 The Caroline incident involved British action against a ship being used by rebels supporting the 
insurrection in Canada, in US territory, and the subsequent diplomatic exchange between Britain and the 
US, see: The Avalon Project, British-American Diplomacy: The Caroline Case, (2008), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp 6 October 2014; Jennings, R, ‘The Caroline and 
McLeod Cases’, (1938) 32(1) The American Journal of International Law, pp.82-84. 
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dispute, itself shows that an armed attack need not emanate from a state’.68 Quite why the ICJ 
has taken a differing stance is unclear. Thus it is advocated the US is absolutely entitled to 
employ self-defence in response to an attack by a non-state actor. 
 
Territorial State Sovereignty 
The US is unequivocal on this matter, stating in the absence of host state consent an operation 
may continue if ‘the host nation is unable or unwilling to suppress the threat posed by the 
individual targeted’.69 This is hardly controversial, and is endorsed by Professor Alston. To most 
it would seem clear that the main locations in which strikes occur: Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Somalia and Yemen, meet the above criteria. Both Yemen and Somalia have consented to 
drone strikes within their borders,70 and the government of Afghanistan has also consented to 
the US-led NATO presence within its country.71 In any case, at present all seem unable to halt 
terrorist activity within their borders. However, with the consent of the state self-defence does 
not have to be invoked, there can be no infringement of the territorial state’s sovereignty if it 
consents to the action.72 
 
Pakistan presents a more complex matter. It is reported the CIA and US military cooperate with 
their Pakistani counterparts and the Pakistani military clears the airspace for US drones.73 
Furthermore, Pakistani troops have supposedly fought the Taliban on several occasions to 
recover downed American drones.74 If consent was not forthcoming surely this level of reported 
cooperation would not exist.75 Publicly the Pakistani government condemns the use of drones in 
a manner inconsistent with consent to these types of operations. 76  The situation is highly 
political. It would seem the Pakistani government is at least complicit in drone operations 
occurring within its territory. Nonetheless, even without consent, Pakistan certainly gives the 
impression of being unwilling or unable to disrupt terrorist activity occurring within its borders. 
                                                          
68
 Greenwood, ‘International Law’, p.17. 
69
 US Department of Justice, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation, pp.1-2. 
70
 Zenko, M, Council on Foreign Relations, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, (2013), Council Special 
Report No.65), p.11; Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur, para.52; Entous, A et al, ‘U.S. Unease 
Over Drone Strikes: Obama Administration Charts Delicate Legal Path Defending Controversial 
Weapons’, The Wall Street Journal, 26 September 2012; Al-Haj, A, ‘Confirmed: US drone strike killed key 
al-Qa’ida leader Saeed al-Shihri in Yemen’, The Independent, 17 July 2013. 
71
 Schmitt, ‘Drone Attacks’, p.314. 
72
 Martin, C, ‘Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defense and the Jus Ad Bellum Regime’ in 
Finkelstein et al, (eds), Targeted Killings, pp.233-234. 
73
 Allbritton, C, ‘Exclusive: How Pakistan helps the U.S. drone campaign’, Reuters, 22 January 2012. 
74
 ‘Pakistan troops fight Taliban after US drone crash’, BBC News, 18 September 2011. 
75
 Ignatius, D, ‘A Quiet Deal With Pakistan’, The Washington Post, 4 November 2008. 
76
 Nauman, Q, ‘Pakistan condemns U.S. drone strikes’, Reuters, 4 June 2012. 
Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2015) 1 
 
87 
 
The very man who was ultimately behind the 9/11 attacks was ‘hiding’ in a garrison town a mere 
50 miles north of the capital, Islamabad.77 Arguably, none of the discussed states suffer an 
infringement of their sovereignty, Art.51 aside, as they all consent on some level to the use of 
force within their borders.78 
 
Occurrence of an Armed Attack? 
Article 51 speaks of ‘self-defence if an armed attack occurs’, yet the leaked Department of 
Justice White Paper refers to ‘an imminent threat of violent attack’ in its criteria of when a lethal 
strike may lawfully proceed outside an area of active hostilities. 79  Evidently there is some 
difference between the actual occurrence, and the imminent threat of an armed attack. Whether 
self-defence can be engaged in such an anticipatory nature will be considered shortly. Firstly 
the term ‘armed attack’ should be considered, and as one might expect there is no universal or 
accepted definition. Some academics suggest a small border incident such as firing a shot at a 
patrol on the other side of an international border would suffice;80 others submit the threshold for 
determination to be considerably higher.81 The latter would appear more in line with the ICJ’s 
interpretation in Nicaragua: ‘if such operation because of its scale and effects, would have been 
classified as an armed attack rather than a mere frontier incident’.82 
 
Despite it not being the Court’s primary objective this statement suggests an ‘armed attack’ 
must go beyond a ‘mere frontier incident’. Nevertheless this does not offer a conclusive test, 
problems can be found with the Court’s cursory interpretation.83 Dinstein finds particular issue 
with the idea of a frontier incident. He contends a rifle shot fired across an international border 
which hits only a cow or tree would not amount to an armed attack, but if the armed forces of 
one state ambush a border patrol of another, this, despite being a frontier incident, has to rank 
as an armed attack warranting a self-defensive response. He asserts it should be the scale and 
effect of the incident which must be considered before making a determination: anything more 
than ‘trifling’ is likely to pass the required threshold.84 The existence of an armed attack is 
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therefore not affected by its scale or effect, unless these are of a trifling nature, but the 
permitted self-defensive force will be, it should be proportionate to the ongoing danger posed.85 
This would seem tenable and all but endorsed by the ICJ in the subsequent Case Concerning 
Oil Platforms: ‘The Court does not exclude the possibility that the mining of a single military 
vessel might be sufficient to bring into play the inherent right of self-defence’.86 Seemingly the 
threshold is lower than some would suggest, but the determination would take place on a case-
by-case basis. Whilst there is no question that 9/11 amounted to an armed attack, the US, some 
13 years later is still acting in self-defence, but in an anticipatory manner to eradicate imminent 
threats, a policy expressly acknowledged in the leaked White Paper.87 
 
Anticipatory Self-Defence 
Drafting of the UN Charter began in San Francisco in spring 1945 with the aim ‘to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war’.88 The Charter codified, under Art.51, when 
inter-state force might be legally employed. The wording is somewhat ambiguous, although 
what seems clear is the Charter speaks of the possibility of self-defence only if an armed attack 
occurs. This seems perverse; even if a victim state has overwhelming evidence of a specific and 
imminent attack, it must still wait for the armed attack to take place before any recourse could 
be initiated under Art.51. Despite the Charter rightly wishing to restrain ‘the threat or use of 
force’89 this seems an absurdly narrow circumstance. Nonetheless, it was deliberate. Governor 
Stassen, a member of the US delegation stated: ‘this was intentional and sound. We did not 
want exercised the right of self-defence before an armed attack had occurred.’90 The provision 
appears at odds with the Caroline Case; widely cited as definitive as to the right of self-defence 
under customary international law. The ensuing diplomatic exchange between Britain and the 
US established two criteria for permissible self-defence: necessity and proportionality. 91 
Proportionality simply prescribes that the self-defensive force employed is proportionate to the 
ongoing threat posed. Necessity was explained by Secretary of State Webster: ‘necessity of that 
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self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of 
deliberation.’92 
 
Put simply, the state contemplating self-defence would need to show the use of force by the 
attacker was so imminent there was nothing other than forcible measures which would halt the 
attack. The criterion did not rule out acting in anticipation to a looming attack, although it would 
seem not to entertain the idea of pre-emptive action against future attacks which are neither 
specific nor imminent. 93  Whilst the customary test is difficult, although not impossible, to 
reconcile with Art.5194 additional support can be found which reinforces this right to anticipatory 
self-defence. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the US argued it should be allowed to 
initiate self-defensive action in advance of any Russian or Cuban use of force, regardless of UN 
Security Council authorization. The matter was discussed in the Security Council, and while in 
this case it was felt the criterion of necessity was not met, there was no express opposition to 
the notion of anticipatory self-defence.95 Again during a Security Council debate concerning 
Israel’s use of force against the United Arab Republic during the Six-Day War, there was no 
resistance to the general concept of anticipatory self-defence.96 Indeed, Attorney General Lord 
Goldsmith confirmed: ‘it has long been the consistent position of successive United Kingdom 
Governments over many years that the right of self-defence under international law includes the 
right to use force where an armed attack is imminent.’ 97  Seemingly then anticipatory self-
defence is widely accepted in order to respond to an imminent armed attack. However, the US 
appears to extend the notion of anticipatory self-defence, acting in a more remote, vague and 
pre-emptive manner. 
 
Pre-emptive Self-Defence 
Despite the US stating only those ‘who pose an imminent threat of violent attack against the 
United States’98 are targeted, very much in line with the principle of necessity, this is arguably 
not the case. Use of the word ‘imminent’ suggests at least superficial knowledge of an attack, 
yet the US contends ‘the United States does not require...clear evidence that a specific attack 
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on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future.’ 99  This widens the 
definition of imminent, relaxing the criterion of necessity laid down in the Caroline incident. 
Lubell notes this type of action to be pre-emptive rather than anticipatory self-defence; it is taken 
in the absence of information regarding a specific future event. Pre-emptive is therefore different 
to the notion of anticipatory self-defence which recognises a specific event which is known to be 
approaching ‘leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.’100 The US justifies 
this pre-emptive action by reference to the type of attacks modern terrorists are capable of, and 
that terrorist cells can so easily melt into the wider civilian environment immediately preceding 
an attack,101 unlike the nature of a large scale military attack which would be easily recognisable 
and difficult to disguise.102 The considerations appear in a 2005 Department of Defense report: 
 Terrorists have demonstrated that they can conduct devastating surprise attacks.  
 Allowing opponents to strike first – particularly in an era of proliferation – is 
 unacceptable.  Therefore, the United States must defeat the most dangerous challenges 
 early and at a safe distance, before they are allowed to mature.103 
 
In addition terrorist attacks are usually aimed at civilian or ‘soft targets’ which are more difficult 
to defend than traditional military targets, potentially meaning that waiting for an attack to 
become imminent would not allow sufficient time to take appropriate self-defensive measures. 
The arguments are undoubtedly compelling, though at present there is little legal support to 
redefine self-defence in such a fashion. 104  The current position was enunciated by Lord 
Goldsmith during Parliamentary debate: ‘international law permits the use of force in self-
defence against an imminent attack but does not authorize the use of force to mount a pre-
emptive strike against a threat that is more remote.’105 He went on to state the concept of what 
constitutes an imminent armed attack will develop to meet new circumstances and threats. 
Perhaps this development is exactly what the US is currently in the process of, after all: 
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 If you do something long enough, the world will accept it. The whole of international law 
 is now based on the notion that an act that is forbidden today becomes permissible if 
 executed by enough countries...international law progresses through violations.’106 
 
Therefore whilst the US doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence is not consistent with current 
principles of international law, perhaps it is these very criteria which are at odds with modern 
day terrorist threats; ‘neither WMD nor terrorist actors were envisioned in this framework [the 
UN Charter]’.107 
 
Self-Defence Against Whom? 
Grounding for the military response against al-Qaeda is found in the AUMF which specifically 
contemplates: ‘nations, organizations, or persons [who] planned, authorized, committed or aided 
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001’.108 Drone strikes in Afghanistan and 
possibly Pakistan in the early days of the programme were specifically targeting those 
individuals.109 However, with the expansion of the programme to Somalia and Yemen a distinct 
problem arises. The terrorists who are targeted in these countries are usually members of al-
Shabaab, a nationalist group that has little in common with al-Qaeda, or al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), who despite sharing a name are said to be quite independent of ‘al-Qaeda 
proper’. 110  Whilst it is easy to assert these groups are affiliated or linked to al-Qaeda to 
accommodate a one-size-fits-all policy, in all likelihood they are not, and even if sufficient links 
could be established these groups were certainly not responsible for the 9/11 attacks.111 This is 
significant: much of the US rhetoric talks of self-defence ‘in response to the...9/11 attacks’112 
and targeting those who ‘planned, authorized, committed or aided’113 their commission, the 
aforementioned groups did not: ‘those subsequent threats posed by different groups cannot be 
simply rolled into the 9/11 justification for the use of armed force against these states [Yemen 
and Somalia].’114 
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It is not suggested here that these groups pose no threat to the US, but encapsulating them all 
in the same legal justification originally used to invade Afghanistan, depose the Taliban and 
target those responsible for 9/11, namely al-Qaeda, is problematic. It is submitted that to 
continue targeting these fragmented groups under the self-defensive justification the US must 
show these groups present a separate threat of imminent armed attack.115 Clearly there are 
issues with the US reliance on self-defence to justify its recourse to force, namely the pre-
emptive nature of many of the strikes, but with the current acquiescence of the discussed host 
states this is merely incidental, that is until consent is either withdrawn or withheld. 
 
3    An Armed Conflict with al-Qaeda? 
‘...like a tango, it takes two to war’116 
Two rights are potentially violated by any targeted killing: the territorial state’s sovereignty, and 
the targeted individual’s right to life. Compliance with Art.51 or host state consent says nothing 
about whether a targeted killing violates the individual’s right to life: this must be justified by 
recourse to either IHL or IHRL. Which regime applies will depend upon the legal 
characterisation of the situation where the strike occurs. The US clearly considers itself 
engaged in a global armed conflict with al-Qaeda117 and those parties contemplated in the 
AUMF. If this assertion is correct its strikes must comply only with IHL,118 effectively making 
them that much easier to justify. However, critics argue against this characterisation contending 
it is neither appropriate nor possible, and maintain a law enforcement response is more suitable 
in dealing with terrorism.119 
 
Despite the Bush administration’s contention that the conflict with the AUMF parties was 
international in nature;120 a curious assertion as an international armed conflict (IAC) can occur 
only between two or more states, 121  neither terror nor al-Qaeda are states. The current 
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administration takes the position that it is actually a non-international armed conflict (NIAC),122 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.123 What constitutes a NIAC 
must be examined before current US policy is considered. Neither the Geneva Conventions, of 
which only Common Art.3 applies to NIACs, nor the Additional Protocols accurately define 
armed conflict.124 Art.1(2) Additional Protocol II merely states: 
 This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as 
 riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not 
 being armed conflicts. 
 
What is now considered the authoritative test was established in Tadic125 and later refined in 
Boskoski.126 It is widely accepted a NIAC can exist between a state and a terrorist group or non-
state actor; 127  however under the Tadic test the group must display an adequate level of 
organisation, and hostilities between the group and the state must attain an adequate level of 
intensity before a NIAC can be said to prevail.128 Specifically, Tadic speaks of ‘protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups’.129 Therefore the US 
can only be involved in a NIAC with ‘al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces’130 if 
the various groups who call themselves, or are ‘associated’, with al-Qaeda can be considered 
an organised single party to the conflict, and whether hostilities between the US and ‘al-Qaeda’ 
reach an adequate level of intensity.131 Unfortunately for the US problems can be noted with 
regard to both criteria. 
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Firstly, those who support this categorisation of an armed conflict with al-Qaeda without 
boundaries132 cite, at most, 15 attacks against American targets in the last 23 years. Most 
notably the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers American barracks in Saudi Arabia, the 2000 
bombing of the USS Cole in a Yemini Harbour, and of course the attacks on the Pentagon and 
World Trade Center in 2001.133 They also refer to numerous thwarted attacks, and al-Qaeda’s 
open ambition to acquire a nuclear device whilst considering the intensity and nature of attacks 
in the aggregate.134 This reasoning is debatable. First, it relies on reaching back through past 
years for evidence of attacks, despite the fact that Lubell notes determination of an armed 
conflict should focus more on current events and present hostilities.135 Nevertheless, Tadic 
spoke of ‘protracted armed violence’ implying past events could be taken account of. However, 
it is usually asserted that the ‘war’ against al-Qaeda focuses upon 11 September 2001 as its 
starting point;136 meaning reaching back further than this date becomes problematic. Second, is 
whether these acts, plots, and attacks cross the required threshold of intensity thus delineating 
an armed conflict. There is no conclusive answer to this point; some suggest this type of 
campaign to be precisely what Additional Protocol II to be referring when it mentioned ‘sporadic 
acts of violence...as not being armed conflicts’.137 Conversely others believe that attacks carried 
out by al-Qaeda, even since 11 September 2001, clearly meet the intensity threshold of a NIAC. 
 Since September 11th, 2001, there have been further brutal terrorist attacks in Bali 
 (twice), Madrid, London, and Jordan. It is quite clear that the conflict with al-Qaeda is not 
 an internal disturbance, nor is it isolated or sporadic.138 
 
This is always going to be a contentious and relatively subjective test, yet it is submitted here, 
even after 9/11, that the level and frequency of attacks conducted by al-Qaeda are exactly what 
Additional Protocol II was drafted to apply.139 Essentially, these very attacks are beyond the 
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ambit of law enforcement rules and methods,140 they are to be dealt with militarily and as such 
reach the required threshold of intensity. 
 
Notwithstanding the above a situation of armed conflict does not necessarily prevail. A second 
criterion must also be fulfilled; the parties to the conflict must display some degree of 
organisation.141 In illustrating this point it is worth considering the Bush Administration’s position 
with regard to the ‘conflict’, this is widely known and still referred to despite Obama’s departure 
from the term, and for good reason.142 In the days after 9/11 the US government coined the 
phrase; the Global War on Terror (GWOT) to characterise its response against those 
responsible, namely al-Qaeda. Initially the phrase was not analysed or even questioned; suffice 
to say 13 years later it has, and in abundance. Legally at least the term is erroneous. Terrorism 
cannot be considered a single party to a conflict, it is not an organised armed group as 
contemplated in Tadic: 143  ‘No social phenomenon, whether terrorism, capitalism, nazism, 
communism, drug abuse or poverty can be a party to a conflict.’144 
 
Despite distancing itself from the GWOT, the Obama administration is still behaving in a manner 
consistent with the Bush-era rhetoric. It has merely replaced terror with ‘al-Qaeda...the Taliban 
and associated forces’. This, much like the GWOT, is precisely where the issue lies. Although it 
is submitted that attacks conducted by ‘al-Qaeda’ collectively reach the required threshold of 
violence necessary to delineate a NIAC, it is very difficult to attribute all these attacks to a single 
party or organisation known as ‘al-Qaeda’.145 As a minimum a party to a conflict must display a 
recognisable organisational structure.146 In Tadic the ICJ spoke of ‘individuals making up an 
organised and hierarchically structured group’,147 and whilst some suggest al-Qaeda in general 
to possess this level of organisation,148 this is difficult to reconcile. Before the 2001 invasion of 
Afghanistan establishing this level of organisation may have been possible. Al-Qaeda at that 
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point displayed a sort of hierarchical structure, possessing a ‘chain of command’ and ‘a set of 
rules’.149 However, with the subsequent invasion, and the recent killing of Osama bin Laden and 
many other key players,150 this becomes increasingly difficult to establish. This view receives 
support from academics, Ken Anderson submits: ‘Islamist terror appears to be fragmenting into 
loose networks of shared ideology and aspiration rather than tightly vertical organisations linked 
by command and control.’151 Similarly Bruce Hoffman notes since 9/11 al-Qaeda: ‘has become 
more an idea or a concept than an organization; an amorphous movement tenuously held 
together by a loosely networked transitional constituency rather than a monolithic, international 
terrorist organization with either a defined or identifiable command and control apparatus.’152 
 
Whilst criticism will always emanate from academic circles it would seem even the FBI agrees. 
The then Director, Robert Mueller, characterised al-Qaeda as a ‘three-tiered threat’ with the 
core al-Qaeda organisation as the top tier, a middle tier of: ‘small groups who have some ties to 
an established terrorist organization, but are largely self-directed. Think of them as al-Qaeda 
franchises – hybrids of homegrown radicals’. In this respect he notes the 7/7 bombers as an 
example of this middle tier, and a bottom tier who: ‘are self-radicalizing, self-financing, and self-
executing. They have no formal affiliation with al-Qaeda, but they are inspired by its message of 
violence.’153 
 
Clearly there are difficulties in contending that all incidents and attacks are conducted by a 
single party or organisation, explicitly evidenced in the difficulties security services faced in 
connecting the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005.154 Therefore unless receiving 
inspiration from the same source would establish ‘an organised and hierarchically structured 
group’ it is not possible to gather all acts, plots and attacks against the US into a single armed 
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conflict, much like terror ‘al-Qaeda’ in the aggregate cannot be a party to a conflict.155 This 
reasoning however, does not necessarily mean the US cannot be involved in NIACs with 
specific terrorist groups, whether al-Qaeda affiliated or not, in specific geographical regions, 
provided the above criteria are met.156 If this is in fact the case IHL would still apply to these 
localised NIACs. Accordingly, it is widely accepted the US is currently participating in a NIAC 
with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.157 Additionally most commentators accept there are currently 
NIACs in Somalia, between the Transitional Federal government and al-Shabaab,158 and in 
Yemen, between the Yemeni government and AQAP.159 The US is participating in both conflicts 
with the apparent consent of the respective governments.160  Drone strikes occurring within 
these territories then are governed by IHL – that is those strikes occurring after the NIACs 
began.161 The situation in Pakistan is anything but straightforward; is there a separate NIAC, is 
the neighbouring conflict in Afghanistan spilling over the border, or is there no armed conflict at 
all? The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) completely discounts the possibility 
of targeting persons directly participating in hostilities who are located in non-belligerent states, 
i.e. members of al-Qaeda located in Pakistan who routinely involve themselves in the NIAC in 
Afghanistan:162 
 Advising otherwise would mean that the whole world is potentially a battlefield and that 
 people moving around the world could be legitimate targets under international 
 humanitarian law wherever they might be. 
 
The ICRC’s reasoning is clear; but it is at odds with academic opinion and actual state 
practice.163  Examples of extraterritorial spill-over include the Vietnamese conflict during the 
1960-70s which spilt over into neighbouring Cambodia; the Rwandan conflict during the 1990s 
which spread to the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo; and the 2006 Israeli 
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offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon.164 As Bassiouni notes: ‘the laws of armed conflict are 
not geographically bound’,165 and whilst IHL should not be applied globally, as the US advances, 
a middling approach would seem logical. To allow terrorists to partake in a neighbouring NIAC 
and not then be subject to IHL themselves, either because their involvement took place from a 
non-belligerent state, or because they have subsequently crossed an international border would 
seem objectionable. 166  Lubell and Derejko perhaps advocate the most coherent approach, 
where the targeted individual would fall under IHL relevant to the neighbouring armed conflict. 
They contend a nexus must be established between the individual and the relevant armed 
conflict by considering three criteria: 
 1 The target’s geographical distance from the primary sphere of hostilities. 
 2 The level and nature of military operations occurring at the target area. 
 3 The link between the target and an already occurring armed conflict.167 
 
The criteria would seem to limit the pervasive spread of IHL, whilst also affording those engaged 
in a specific conflict a common-sense approach to where individuals may be targeted. The issue 
is anything but agreed upon; however the above finds support with the majority of 
commentators.168 Milanovic submits: 
 if there is a sufficient nexus between an ongoing NIAC and military operations that are 
 occurring outside the areas in which the conflict and ‘protracted armed violence’ 
 normally take place, these military operations will nevertheless be understood as part of 
 the overall armed conflict. This reasoning can be extended by analogy to military 
 operations outside the state.169 
 
It is therefore asserted the majority of US drone strikes are likely governed by IHL; the strikes 
take place in locations where the US is participating in NIACs.170 However, the US standpoint 
that every drone strike anywhere in the world is governed by IHL is legally problematic; a strike 
occurring outside an area of recognised armed conflict and without a sufficient nexus will be 
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regulated by IHRL.171 With the US’ apparent intention to expand the programme further to 
encompass al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb targets in North Africa, who have little or no 
‘involvement [with] al-Qaeda’s central leadership in Pakistan’, the question of which legal sphere 
operations fall under will become increasingly salient.172 
 
4    Drone Strikes under IHL’s Cardinal Principles 
‘...the laws of war are not the laws of cricket and there is nothing ‘unsporting’ in not putting your 
pilots at risk.’173 
The US consistently notes that all targeting operations are ‘conducted consistently with law of 
war principles’ and ‘great care is taken to adhere to these principles in both planning and 
execution’.174 In light of these statements and the above conclusions, the US’ use of lethal drone 
strikes will be considered in line with the cardinal principles of the jus in bello. Unlike the jus ad 
bellum, which governs the initial resort to force, the jus in bello determines the legality of 
individual operations. The analysis is highly strike and fact-specific, each and every strike must 
be weighed against these principles. Therefore, whilst the legality of specific strikes will likely be 
out-of-reach, owing to a lack of knowledge of US targeting decisions and strike results, the 
principles will be discussed contemplating the programme in the aggregate. 
 
Military Necessity 
Military necessity is related to the primary aim of armed conflict, it is the very principle which 
drives targeting operations.175 Necessity accepts the reality of conflict and can be defined as: 
‘that principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are 
indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.’176 
The principle is of a customary nature and is referred to in Additional Protocol I, Art.23(g) Hague 
IV and Art.8 Rome Statute.177 It applies to both IACs and NIACs, to states and non-state actors 
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alike. 178  Essentially: ‘military necessity justifies the application of force not forbidden by 
International Law, to the extent necessary, for the realization of the purpose of armed 
conflict.’179 Accordingly, necessity can be analysed and concluded relatively easily. Given that 
senior officials have referred to strikes as ‘very effective’ and ‘the only game in town in terms of 
confronting or trying to disrupt the al-Qaeda leadership’,180 coupled with the difficulties faced in 
inserting ground troops into the remote and dangerous locations in which drones are 
deployed, 181  the US would almost certainly contend that drones offer ‘a definite military 
advantage’182 and ‘are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as 
soon as possible.’ This would seem a reasonable assertion, although very much essential, as 
drones become an increasingly central part of the US military arsenal. To this end drones are no 
different from any other weapons platform. Each individual application must be analysed by the 
commander or operator, and they must answer in the affirmative whether the strike offers a 
distinct military advantage for the accomplishment of the goal.183 However, the principle must be 
weighed against relevant international law, specifically the remaining IHL principles. 
 
Humanity/Unnecessary Suffering 
The principle of humanity provides a counter-balance to the necessities of war. It ensures a 
balance between hostile measures taken to subdue the enemy and the obligation to limit the 
associated suffering of armed conflict.184 Humanity requires the parties to exercise restraint 
when an act would cause unnecessary suffering or injury, even if the act would satisfy the other 
principles of IHL.185 Humanity is reflected in numerous treaty provisions,186 notably in Common 
Art.3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Humanity is therefore equally applicable to IACs and 
NIACs.187 There is no evidence to suggest a drone strike would cause any more suffering or 
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injury than more traditional forms of aerial bombardment.188 On the contrary, the majority of 
missiles fired from drones are said to have a smaller blast radius than munitions deployed from 
conventional platforms.189 Nevertheless, it is not the munitions deployed that draw criticism; it is 
the locations in which they are deployed. Terrorists intentionally hide in civilian locations, 
purposely failing to distinguish themselves from the general population; they deliberately fail to 
wear any sort of ‘uniform’ to complicate identification. This has led to collateral damage, and it is 
this which irks critics. 190  However, there is no evidence to suggest drone strikes cause 
‘superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering’191 compared with other available means. In fact 
utilising a drone which provides increased loiter times, reduced munitions damage and a real-
time video feed will likely lead to a more precise and distinguishing attack, consequently 
reducing any collateral damage and unnecessary suffering. Therefore unless capture is feasible, 
which the US supposedly monitors, or a less injurious method is practicable, drone strikes are 
unlikely to violate the principle of humanity. 
 
Proportionality 
The very existence of the principle of proportionality is acceptance that collateral damage to 
civilians and civilian objects will inevitably occur during armed conflict. Much like necessity it 
accepts the realities of war and aims to ‘minimize civilian casualties, not to eliminate them 
altogether.’192 The principle is considered customary in nature and is codified in Art.51.5(b) and 
57.2(b) Additional Protocol I. Respectively, the Articles relate to civilian protection generally, and 
necessary precautions to be taken in an attack on a military objective. The US Army Field 
Manual defines proportionality simply: ‘loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks 
must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be 
gained.’193 Essentially, any incidental harm to civilians or civilian objects must not outweigh the 
military advantage expected to be gained. The principle is not judged with the benefit of 
hindsight, but from the perspective of the-would-be attacker. The question is not whether the 
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actual harm was excessive, but had the situation been as the attacker reasonably believed it to 
be, based on the intelligence, would the harm have been excessive? 194  This position is 
reinforced by use of the word ‘expected’ in Additional Protocol I. The archetypal example is a 
drone strike on a building thought to hold a senior al-Qaeda member, for argument’s sake let us 
say Osama bin Laden. The attacker possesses reliable intelligence that Osama is at home 
along with three civilians. He reasonably believes no other alternatives exist to a drone strike, 
and Osama will escape if the attack is delayed. Most would consider this attack to be 
proportionate, the collateral damage is not excessive compared to the concrete military 
advantage expected to be gained. Nonetheless, unbeknown to the attacker Osama has 
escaped and three more civilians have entered the house. The attack goes ahead and kills six 
civilians and no al-Qaeda members. In this case, the actual results of the attack have no 
bearing on its legality; it is proportionate based on the preceding reasonable judgment of the 
attacker.195 
 
Whilst potentially making US strikes that much easier to justify, legally at least, another facet 
must be considered. Proportionality relies on the term ‘excessive’; yet there is no accepted 
definition of what harm is deemed excessive. The ICRC-published commentary on the 
Additional Protocols states; when there is hesitation between civilian losses and the anticipated 
military advantage, interests of the civilian population should prevail and that civilian harm 
should never be extensive. Determining what is excessive is clearly open for interpretation, the 
military advantage expected to be gained must simply be weighed against incidental civilian 
harm, which must never be ‘extensive’.196 In this respect different countries’ interpretations of 
what is considered excessive seem to differ wildly.197 Whilst the UK seemed to suggest the 
deaths of four Afghan civilians during a Reaper strike, which killed two insurgents and destroyed 
a large quantity of explosives, may have been disproportionate to the military advantage gained, 
the US appears to take a differing view.198 In June 2009, the CIA killed a Pakistan Taliban 
Commander, Khwaz Wali Mehsud. The US planned to use his body as bait to target Baitullah 
Mehsud, the then leader of the Pakistan Taliban, who was expected to attend the funeral. 
Reportedly up to 5,000 people attended, not only Taliban fighters but also civilians. US drones 
struck, killing as many as 83 people. Reportedly up to 45 civilians were killed, including ten 
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children and four tribal leaders. Baitullah escaped unharmed.199 Despite during US counter-
insurgency operations proportionality is ‘calculated not in terms of how many insurgents are 
killed or detained, but rather which enemies are killed or detained’,200 this would still seem to be 
precisely what the ICRC commentary was referring to by ‘extensive’ incidental losses or 
damages, even considering Baitullah’s rank. Even if these losses were not deemed extensive, 
most would consider this type of attack to cause excessive loss of life and damage to property 
incidental to the ‘concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.’201 It is simply 
not possible to assess every strike conducted under the programme, although what is known is 
alarming. It should be noted news reports have been relied upon to analyse the issue, and facts 
are often difficult to ascertain in the remote regions in which strikes are carried out. 
Nevertheless, based on the above and the lacuna of official reports, the US has very probably 
breached this cardinal principle of IHL.202 
 
Distinction 
The concept of distinction is perhaps the most significant battlefield principle.203 It is considered 
customary in nature204 and simply obligates combatants to distinguish between lawful objects of 
attack and all other persons, places and things in the battle-space.205 Additional Protocol I Art.48, 
states: ‘the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population 
and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives’.206 Art.52.2 defines military 
objectives, while Arts.51.4 and 51.5 prohibit and define indiscriminate attacks. Art.13 Additional 
Protocol II, specific to NIACs, provides for civilian protection, albeit in diluted form. The principle 
seems clear; a drone operator may target only combatants and military objectives.207 Targeting 
civilians and civilian objects is explicitly prohibited. However, a specific term serves to muddy 
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the waters. Both Additional Protocols forbid the targeting of civilians ‘unless and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities’,208 thus civilians must never be targeted unless they have 
forfeited their protected status by directly participating in hostilities (DPH).209 The major difficulty 
in the majority of counter-insurgency operations ‘is that the line between combatant and civilian, 
and military objective and civilian object is often blurry and undefined’. 210  The enemy 
intentionally fails to distinguish himself from the civilian population in an attempt to garner 
protection, thus making distinction a demanding task. To determine whether US strikes comply 
with the principle it must be decided whether they distinguish sufficiently between combatant 
and civilian, and whether strikes are conducted indiscriminately. 
i)  Distinction between Combatant and Civilian 
During a NIAC the US must ensure it targets only members of the organised armed group the 
US is involved in the conflict with, and civilians who DPH. The difficulty is most terrorists, at 
least relevant to this discussion, either pose as civilians or co-locate themselves within the 
general population.211 Additionally many of their operations target civilians, with some utilising 
civilians in an attempt to protect themselves directly.212 Thus simply distinguishing terrorists from 
civilians becomes a gruelling task; direct participation in hostilities further complicates the 
analysis. This makes deciding exactly when those who DPH may be targeted all the more 
important, and as one may imagine divergent opinions exist.213 In an effort to clarify the situation 
the ICRC released interpretative guidance regarding the subject. The controversial report 
makes the distinction between members of organised armed groups belonging to a non-state 
party who assume a ‘continuous combat function’, and civilians who directly participate in 
hostilities. 214  Those who perform a continuous combat function, meaning they continually 
assume a function involving DPH, may be targeted for as long as their integration within the 
organisation lasts. The latter who participate ‘on a merely spontaneous, sporadic or 
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unorganized basis, or who assume exclusively political, administrative or other non-combat 
functions’215 may only be attacked for such time as they actually DPH.216 The distinction is 
hardly decisive with little apparent difference between a continuous combat function and DPH, 
other than the duration of participation, and perhaps the level of integration within the group. 
 
The US, unsurprisingly, appears to make no such distinction. Former Legal Advisor Koh 
asserted, ‘individuals who are part of such an armed group are belligerents and, therefore, 
lawful targets under international law’217 meaning they are targetable at any point.218 There was 
no recognition of the combat function performed by the individual, which supposedly determines 
when and if they may be targeted. One would also assume, based on reports that military-age 
males in areas of known terrorist activity qualify as lawful targets,219 the US would consider a 
civilian who directly participates, even on a sporadic basis, as a member of the armed group220 
and therefore targetable at any point, not merely during that moment of participation. This is 
perhaps not as controversial as one might imagine, Professor Dinstein contends: 
 a person is not allowed to wear simultaneously two caps: the hat of a civilian and the 
 helmet of a soldier. A person who engages in military raids by night, while purporting to 
 be an innocent civilian by day, is neither a civilian nor a lawful combatant. He is an 
 unlawful combatant. He is a combatant in the sense that he can be lawfully targeted by 
 the enemy, but he cannot claim the privileges appertaining to lawful combatancy. Nor 
 does he enjoy the benefits of civilian status.221 
 
Whilst this statement is made with regard to IACs, why should a civilian who DPH during a NIAC 
be treated any differently? Thus the ICRC’s position is somewhat problematic. It seemingly 
affords individuals the best of both worlds: the ability to fight against the US, and the protections 
granted to civilians once the hostile act is completed. The guidance is somewhat skewed and 
appears to offer the non-state actor and civilian who DPH more protection than their 
adversaries,222 not to mention almost shackling the US to a law enforcement paradigm of when 
‘civilians’ may be targeted.223 As Vogel asserts, the ICRC stance ‘seems to misunderstand 
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grossly the nature of the AUMF conflict’224 where terrorists routinely remove themselves from 
the physical battle to regroup, retrain and join sleeper cells.225 Presumably these activities would 
not qualify as DPH, but to then afford these persons civilian status merely because they have 
momentarily set down their arms and been re-tasked would seem unconscionable. It is asserted 
here that those who DPH, no matter the length of participation, may be targeted at any 
subsequent point. They may not drop arms once confronted and claim civilian protection, ‘for it 
is manifest that he who fights should be hung if he fights with a gun in one hand and a purwana 
[a permit given to civilians for their protection] in the other’.226 Whether US strikes distinguish 
sufficiently depends upon which view is taken. If the ICRC’s stance is adhered to those that 
occur away from traditional skirmishes with US forces, where the targeted individual is not 
engaged in a hostile act, would likely breach the principle. However, if one were to take the view 
propounded here: that those who DPH, no matter the length of participation, are to be 
considered members of the organised armed group and thus targetable at any point, the US can 
more easily be said to observe the principle. 
ii)  Are Drone Strikes Indiscriminate? 
An indiscriminate attack is one in which the attacker takes no measures to ensure non-military 
objectives are not targeted, where the means and methods employed cannot be sufficiently 
directed, or whose effects cannot be limited.227 Even if strikes sufficiently distinguish between 
civilian and combatant the US must still ensure they are conducted discriminately to comply with 
the principle of distinction.228 Additional Protocol I Art.57, again considered to reflect customary 
law, states ‘constant care’ and ‘all feasible precautions’ shall be taken to spare the civilian 
population and civilian objects. An attacker must do ‘everything feasible to verify that the 
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects’.229  Provided the attacker 
complies with this requirement and still has reasonable grounds to believe the target is a 
combatant, or a military object, the attack is lawful. 230  Attackers must therefore utilise the 
optimum means available to verify the status of the target, although the means must also make 
sense militarily. In this respect drones, which offer extensive loiter times and possess high 
quality video feeds, should offer the attacker enhanced target recognition capabilities. However, 
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if it makes military sense the drone should be teamed with other assets to ensure only the 
correct objectives are targeted.231  In addition the method of attack must minimise harm to 
civilians and civilian objects; that is to the extent that no military advantage is sacrificed. Despite 
the criticism, drones are precise. They offer dramatically enhanced loiter times,232 increased 
processing power and video imagery,233 whilst additionally deploying low blast radius munitions. 
This increased precision should allow for far more distinguishing strikes compared with current 
alternatives; however it is ultimately US policy which determines levels of discrimination. 
Furthermore, Art.57.2(c) prescribes: ‘effective advance warnings shall be given of attacks which 
may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.’ However, it is roundly 
accepted the need for surprise in certain attacks precludes the issuance of warnings.234 In most 
drone strikes the need for surprise is critical to the mission’s success; otherwise the target 
would simply flee. Therefore the need for advance warnings is thus negated. Drone technology 
has the potential to provide far more discriminating strikes compared with current alternatives. A 
drone can monitor a target for increased periods of time, striking only when the target is a 
distance from civilians and civilian objects, whilst also utilising low collateral damage munitions. 
Where civilians are killed it is not the fault of the technology, more the people and policy behind 
it. 235  Clearly then, drones should enhance levels of distinction, however the indiscriminate 
nature of some strikes mean the US has, at times, undoubtedly breached this fundamental 
principle. 
 
5    Drone Strikes under IHRL 
‘Outside the context of armed conflict, the use of drones for targeted killings is almost never 
likely to be legal.’236 
Whilst most US strikes likely take place in situations of armed conflict the legal implications of a 
strike occurring away from such an area must be considered. Initially, it must be acknowledged 
                                                          
231
 Ibid; for example: troops on the ground to provide additional target recognition. However, it must be 
considered the areas in which drones are usually deployed are remote and dangerous; it would not make 
sense militarily to deploy troops to these areas simply to aid in target recognition. In these scenarios it is 
the drone which makes sense militarily and therefore its video feed must be relied upon. 
232
 Predator and Reaper drones can remain aloft for over 14 hours compared to four hours or less for an 
F-16 fighter jet. 
233
 Singer, Wired for War, pp.397-398. 
234
 Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, Commentary on the 
HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, (2010, Version 2.1), Section G 
II 37.6, p.133. 
235
 Singer, Wired for War, p.398. 
236
 Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur, para.85. 
Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2015) 1 
 
108 
 
the US consistently denies that IHRL applies extraterritorially,237 instead arguing US domestic 
law, specifically the AUMF, would regulate any strike not governed by IHL.238 This position has 
been argued against, and rightly so.239 With no armed conflict in progress IHL would not apply to 
the targeted killing, and under the US admission IHRL would also not apply due to the killing 
taking place outside the US. Thus, in the absence of an armed conflict, those killed 
extraterritorially would have no protection under international law: an unacceptable position. The 
right to life is fundamental and is protected by every major IHRL instrument.240 Nevertheless, the 
right is not absolute and individuals are only protected against being ‘arbitrarily’241 killed. A killing 
is not arbitrary provided the lethal force was both proportionate and necessary,242 proportionate 
in the sense the force was required to protect life, and necessary in the sense that no other 
alternative, such as capture and arrest, could prevent that threat to life.243 Essentially, a state 
may only use lethal force when a suspect poses an imminent threat to the lives of others, and 
when no other means can prevent that threat. The criterion of imminence ensures lethal force 
can only be employed against those who genuinely intend to launch an attack; it cannot be used 
simply because the suspect cannot be apprehended.244 
 
Special Rapporteur Alston and various human rights groups suggest a targeted killing 
conducted using an armed drone could never be legal under IHRL.245 This is incorrect.246 There 
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are certain, albeit narrow, situations in which a drone could legally target an individual outside 
an armed conflict. That said there is a vital difference between IHL and IHRL. Under the IHL 
principle of proportionality, killing individuals who are not lawful targets during the course of a 
strike does not necessarily render that strike unlawful. This however, is alien to IHRL where the 
attacking state must have an independent justification for every individual killed in a strike.247 
This effectively means killing anyone other than the target would violate IHRL. Accordingly, it 
would seem targeted killings can be lawfully effected under IHRL. However, it would need to be 
shown the targeted individual was involved in the planning or execution of an imminent attack 
which threatened human life;248 that the target was currently located in a remote region to which 
there was no quick access, even for the territorial security services; that it was, therefore, 
impossible to effect a detention operation; that the only way of stopping the individual was via a 
missile launched from a distance from a drone; that there was no other less lethal option of 
targeting the individual; and if the individual was not targeted at that moment it would be 
impossible to locate him again before the imminent attack.249 
 
In the case of McCann250  the actual killings by the security services were not unlawful. 251 
Soldiers from the SAS shot and killed three Provisional IRA members suspected to have been 
about to detonate a car bomb. The killings, at that moment, were considered necessary and 
proportionate to prevent an imminent threat to human life. Nevertheless, earlier opportunities to 
arrest the suspects were missed; the operation, therefore, breached IHRL. 252  The case 
illustrates, but for earlier failings, the distinct possibility of lawfully employing lethal force outside 
an area of armed conflict. The threat was clearly imminent: the soldiers thought the suspects 
were reaching for remote detonators to trigger a blast when all three were killed.253 The major 
difficulty the US would have in justifying a lethal strike under IHRL would be showing the threat 
of an imminent armed attack, which could not be stopped using non-lethal methods. In a 2002 
strike in Yemen, probably before armed conflict began in the country, the US killed Abu Ali al-
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Harithi the supposed architect of the USS Cole bombing. 254  Evidence showed Yemeni 
authorities had been tracking al-Harithi for months before the strike. The subsequent strike very 
probably breached IHRL: the suspect could have been detained during the preceding months of 
surveillance; additionally it was unclear al-Harithi presented an imminent threat at that time.255 
The strike was seemingly a retrospective one, punishing al-Harithi for earlier offences which, 
however heinous, is not permitted under IHRL. This clearly shows the difficulties the US would 
face in justifying a strike under IHRL. However, despite the criteria being narrow, it is not 
impossible, unlike some suggest, to lawfully employ a lethal strike outside an armed conflict and 
therefore under IHRL. 
 
Conclusion 
‘To the United States, a drone strike seems to have very little risk and very little pain. At the 
receiving end, it feels like war. Americans have got to understand that.’256 
Despite their equivocal and protracted development UAVs have become a fixture of the modern 
military arsenal.257 Their versatility and relentless unerring gaze, combined with almost surgical 
lethality means,258 perhaps, they really are ‘the only game in town in terms of confronting or 
trying to disrupt the al-Qaeda leadership’.259 However, problems are abundant although not 
necessarily with the technology. The UK operates a fleet of Reaper UAVs which sparks little 
controversy. 260  Perhaps the biggest problem with the US programme is the failure to 
acknowledge or release much of the information on which its strikes rely, or even publicly 
discuss the programme in the aggregate.261 This shadowy and secretive approach only serves 
to strengthen the criticism, perhaps through a misunderstanding of the technology, the laws of 
war, disagreement with US legal justification or even mistaken or wrongly reported facts. 
Essentially, a more transparent programme would be a more acceptable programme. 
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Despite the secrecy, what we do know creates significant cause for concern. Firstly, current US 
justification cannot easily be reconciled with the jus ad bellum. Targeting all terrorist groups, 
even those with little in common with al-Qaeda, under the AUMF is extremely problematic, as is 
the apparent re-definition of what constitutes an imminent armed attack and the invocation of 
pre-emptive self-defence. Unless the jus ad bellum is subject to radical overhaul and evolution, 
to account for more immediate and devastating weaponry, it is likely current US policy breaches 
this area of international law – specifically the practice of pre-emptive self-defence where a 
specific threat cannot be identified. 262  However, with host-state consent this is merely 
incidental.263 Secondly, the US insistence that all strikes are governed by IHL is simply incorrect. 
A situation of armed conflict must either be established between the specific targeted group and 
the US, or the US must be participating in an armed conflict at the behest of one of the parties 
for IHL to apply. A strike in an area where one of these criteria does not exist, or where a 
sufficient nexus cannot be established, would otherwise be governed by IHRL. Thirdly, serious 
questions remain as to whether many strikes even comply with IHL. The principle of 
proportionality appears to be all but ignored in some cases, and while the technology should 
allow for increased distinction, targeting decisions seem to render the advantages offered all but 
redundant when it comes to avoiding civilian casualties. Fourthly, and finally, although 
technically possible legally to conduct a lethal strike under IHRL, the extremely narrow 
permissible circumstances mean many attacks carried out would almost certainly breach 
international human rights norms.  
 
The criticism has perhaps been heeded in America. In the President’s recent State of the Union 
address he remarked, ‘America must move off a permanent war footing’ and that he had 
‘imposed prudent limits on the use of drones’.264 However, no elaboration was offered as to 
whether this would apply to the programme as a whole, or just to activity in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan to coincide with the decreasing US presence within Afghanistan.265 The programme’s 
future is as murky as its legal footing. Although with such an extensive fleet and no apparent 
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halt to the threat of terrorism one would expect ‘more continuity than change’266  from the 
superpower. 
 
Despite the many advantages using a drone should have over many military alternatives – not 
just for the operator, but the civilians on the ground too – the secrecy and lack of transparency, 
the rigid and unacknowledged policy, and at times truly unacceptable targeting decisions 
undermine the quite brilliant technology. Thanks to these reasons for most a Predator drone 
conjures up a sinister, even evil, image of an indiscriminate and bloodthirsty robot intent on 
killing all in its path. Ironically it is the human policy behind the killer which is responsible for this. 
Whilst the legality of strikes is very much determined on a case-by-case basis and, despite the 
fact drone strikes may well be ‘the only game in town’, the game may, at times, be an unlawful 
one. 
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